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Received shin ton Conscen 9:39 A.M. aDT Saturday 31 Aur 68

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FECT WALT MOSTON
THE PRETIDENT
CITE CAP 1319

STOFFT

HERE ITH MOSCON'S LINE TO THE 1.3. CUMULIST PARTY .. CZZCHOSLOVAFIA, VIA FOI.

60-34 30-34-03 مىنغ

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED MELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION HAS INFORMED THE COMMUNIST PARTY UNITED STATES OF AN ERICA AS FOLLOWS CONCERNING THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN SITUATION:

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET ' HICK CONSIDERS ALEXANDER DUBCEK, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHGSLCVAKIA, A "DOUBLE CROSSING LIAK". EEGINNING SEVEN MONTHS ASO, THE SOVIETS HELD NUMEROUS MEETINGS WITH THE CZECHS IN WHICH DUBCEK WAS WARNED BY THE RUSSIANS THAT THEFF WAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHCSLCVAKIA WAS LOSING COLTROL AND THAT RICHT WING COUNTERREVOLUTIO ANY FORCES WERE PREPARING TO TAKE OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THEY WERE TRAINING FIGHTING FORCES, STUGGLING IN WEAPONS ET CETERA. DUBCEK WAS INVITED TO ATTEND THE WARSAW MEETING IN JULY, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, BUT REFLED AND LATER STATED HE DID NOT ATTEND BECAUSE HE WAS NOT INVITED. THEN AT THE CIERNA MEETING AND AGAIN AT THE BRATISLAVA MEETING, WHICH DUBCEK ATTENDED, HE WAS INFORMED IN CONCRETE DETAILS CONCERNING COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN CLECHOSLOVARIA, THE DETAILS OF WHICH WERE NOT PUBLISHED IN THE COMMUNIQUES AND STILL CAN NOT BE DISCUSSED. SOWE OF THESE DETAILS WERE CONFIRMED BY MEMBERS OF THE CIECH-OGLOVAKIA I COMMUNIST PARTY PRESIDIUM, "HO ATTENDE I I MEETINGS. DUBCEK GAVE ASSURATIONS THAT HE WOULD CONTROL THE TE MATTERS, BUT FAILED TO MAYE ANY AFFORT TO DO SC ALD LATTERS GOT STEADILY WORSE. IN FACT. DU DER EVEN ENTRUSTED SOME DETAILS OF INVESTIGATING THE SITUATION TO JOSEF PAVEL, CZECH MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, WHO THE BUSSIALS HAD WALNED WAS COOPERATING WITH THE RIGHT WING COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES. CO.FIFWATION OF PAULL'S GLILT IS THE FACT THAT HE DISAPPEARED ON THE DAY OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HAS NOT BEEN SEEN SINCE.

THE SOVIET UNION, ITS SOCIALIST ALLIES AND "KFACOMMUNISTS" IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA MUST VIEW THIS SITUATI NO FROM
THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE RELATION OF FORCES IN EUROPE AND
THEVORLD, AND, THERFFORF, DECIDED THAT ACTION MUST BE
TAKEN TO PREVENT CZECHOSLOVAKIA FROM BEING TAKEN FROM THE
SOCIALIST CAMP, THUS CHANCING THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN
EUROPE AND THE WORLD. IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE RICHT WING
TO COMMUNICATE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. AND IF PER TITED

THE RESULTS OF THIS CLUBIESS WOLLD SE THOMKISLE". THE COUNTESS OF THE SECURITY TO SOME EOIS DELICARRY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. ALL REAL CLYNINISTS OF THE EFLINITY ATED. THIS WOULD OFFI. THE WESTERN BOLDER TO LESS STRATECIC POSITION, YOULD JEOPALDIZE THE SECURITY OF ALL WARSA PACT COUNTRIES. IN SPITE OF REPEATED WARNINGS, DUBGER DID NOTHING TO COUNTESS THE SITUATION, TO, THEREFORE, THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES DECIDED TO INTERVENT ILITARILY AT THAT TIME, DECAUSE IF THEY DELATED WHITH THE COUNTERREPOLUTIONARY FORCES SECAME ENTREMORED, IT OFFICE MANY TIMES NORE DIFFICULT TO DISLODGE THE.

WHEN THE SOVIET TROOPS REACHED PRAGLE, THEY CO.FIFMED THEIR INTELLIGENCE AND UNCOVERED ARMS CACHES IN THE BASE-MENTS OF ELEVEN GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES, INCLUDING ALTI TANK GUNS, HEAVY MACHINE GUID, GRENADE LAUNCHERS, ET CETERA. SCVIET AND ALLIED TROOPS UNCOVERED CACHES OF UNITED STATES. AND WEST GERMAN ARMS TOTALLING MORE THAN FORTY THOUSAND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS IN THE MOUNTAILS, NEAR THE BORDERS, I BHATISLAVA, BRNO, OSTROVA, ET CETCHA. THEY FOUND SECRET PRINTING SHOPS AND MOBILE RADIO STATIO. S MOUITED ON SPECIAL TRUCKS. THESE ITEMS MAY SOON BE EXHIBITED IN A PRAGUE SQUARE. THE SOVIETS KNOW WHERE AND HOW SOME OF THESE ITEMS CHOSSED THE BORDERS FROM AUSTRIA AND WEST CERMANY AND WHO IS RESPONSIBLE. THEY KNOW THAT THREE HUNDRED ORGANIZERS WERE BROUGHT IN FROM THE WEST TO LEAD THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES. OBVIOUSLY, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE DREW MORE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE COUNTERREVOLUTION IN HUNGARY IN NINETEEN FIFTY SIX, THAN SOME COMMUNISTS DREW. THE "ENEMY" IS OBVIOUSLY SMARTER AND, IN THE CASE OF CZECH-OSLOVAKIA, WAS MORE SOPHISTICATED IN PREPARING THE COUNTERREVOLUTION.

AS A RESULT OF THE MOSCOW CONTACTS WITH THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN LEADERSHIP, MEMBERS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN PRESIDIUM SAW THE TRUE SITUATION AND THEMSELVES REQUESTED THAT THE SOVIET TROOPS REMAIN IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA UNTIL THAT THE SOVIET TROOPS REMAIN IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA UNTIL THAT THE CLANDESTINE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL BE DECLARED ILLECAL AND SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A WIDE STRUGGLE AND THAT THE EMEMY COULD MOBILIZE TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PEOPLE TO FIGHT FOR THE COUNTERREVOLUTION, BUT IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE COUNTERREVOLUTION, BUT IT IS

THIS SOURCE ALSO ADVISED THAT THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST VORKERS PARTY HAS INFORMED COMMUNIST PARTY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF SIMILAR INFORMATION INCLUDING THE FACT THAT ITS FIRST SECRETARY, JANOS KADAR, PERSONALLY CALLED DUBCEK AND THE WITH HIM NEAR THE HUNGARIAN BURDER LAST AUGUST THAT IF HE DID NOT DO SOMETHING QUICKLY, THE WARSAW PACT AVAIL AND THE INVASION FOLLOWED.

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